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Over the last years, a number of stochastic models have been proposed for
analysing the spread of nosocomial infections in hospital settings. These
models often account for a number of factors governing the spread
dynamics: spontaneous patient colonization, patient–staff contamination/
colonization, environmental contamination, patient cohorting or healthcare
workers (HCWs) hand-washing compliance levels. For each model, tailor-
designed methods are implemented in order to analyse the dynamics of
the nosocomial outbreak, usually by means of studying quantities of interest
such as the reproduction number of each agent in the hospital ward, which
is usually computed by means of stochastic simulations or deterministic
approximations. In this work, we propose a highly versatile stochastic mod-
elling framework that can account for all these factors simultaneously, and
which allows one to exactly analyse the reproduction number of each
agent at the hospital ward during a nosocomial outbreak. By means of
five representative case studies, we show how this unified modelling frame-
work comprehends, as particular cases, many of the existing models in the
literature. We implement various numerical studies via which we (i) high-
light the importance of maintaining high hand-hygiene compliance levels
by HCWs, (ii) support infection control strategies including to improve
environmental cleaning during an outbreak and (iii) show the potential of
some HCWs to act as super-spreaders during nosocomial outbreaks.1. Introduction
The risk of acquiring nosocomial infections is a recognized problem in health-
care facilities worldwide [1]. It has been estimated that nosocomial infections
affect more than 4 million patients in Europe each year, leading to E7 billion
of direct medical costs [2]. Moreover, the emergence and spread of antibiotic
resistance among these pathogens has posed a second major problem world-
wide, stressing the need for understanding their transmission routes in
healthcare facilities, and to identify the most effective infection control strategies
in these settings [3]. A paradigmatic example of an antibiotic-resistant nosoco-
mial pathogen is bacteria Staphylococcus aureus (SA), which is a normal
inhabitant of the skin and mucosal surfaces, but can cause different infections
when it flourishes in other areas (e.g. soft tissue, bloodstream or lung infec-
tions). SA resistance against penicillin-like antibiotics arose a few years after
the introduction of penicillin. Moreover, methicillin-resistant SA (MRSA) strains
were reported in Europe after only 2 years of the introduction of methicillin in
1959 [4]. Currently, new strains of MRSA have been reported which are also
resistant to vancomycin [4].
Healthcare environments such as hospitals or nursing homes are ideal set-
tings for the spread of multidrug-resistant bacteria (MDRB), due to, among
other reasons, opportunities for bacteria to enter into the bloodstream or
infect open wounds, the presence of immunocompromised and aged individ-
uals, and the high exposure levels to antibiotics [5,6]. The precise mode of
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but usually both exogenous (e.g. cross-colonization) and
endogenous (e.g. selective pressure of antibiotics) routes are
considered as feasible for these pathogens [3]. While for
some nosocomial infections most of the transmission is con-
sidered to occur via HCW–patient contact routes [7], there
is increasing recognition in the literature of the potential
role played by environmental contamination and airborne
spread [8–10].
Infection control strategies usually implemented in hospital
settings include, among others, hand disinfection procedures,
environmental cleaning, active screening for colonization
among patients and isolation of colonized individuals, mana-
ging staffing levels, antibiotic prescription and decolonization
procedures, or patient cohorting [11]. However, control pro-
cedures followed in healthcare facilities worldwide usually
amount to combinations of the individual interventions listed
above, so that the efficacy of each individual strategy is hard
to measure. On the other hand, the application of classical epi-
demiology procedures for addressing this individual efficacy
is often not feasible due to financial and ethical restrictions
[4,12]. Thus, mathematical modelling is one of the best tools
available for understanding the role played by different factors
on the emergence and spread of these pathogens and their anti-
biotic resistance, while measuring the impact of individual
interventions [8,13].
A wide range of deterministic and stochastic mathematical
models for the spread of nosocomial pathogens have been
developed during the last years [2]. Although deterministic
models were originally proposed for capturing the main infec-
tion dynamics in single wards and hospitals, modelling efforts
were soon redirected towards the stochastic perspective due to
the small and highly heterogeneous populations usually pre-
sent in these settings. From a stochastic perspective, most of
the models proposed in the literature are based on Markov
processes, where it is assumed that inter-event times are expo-
nentially distributed. This simplifying assumption is usually
crucial for analytically and computationally treating the pro-
cesses under study; we refer the reader to Pelupessy et al. [3]
for a discussion on the advantages of stochastic (in particular,
Markovian) approaches, and to van Kleef et al. [2] and Assab
et al. [14] for systematic reviews in this field. Stochastic
models in this area can be classified as compartment-based,
where the population of individuals is classified in groups
according to their state against the disease, and wide homoge-
neities are assumed among the members within the same
group, or agent-based, where one keeps track of the state of
each individual within the population throughout time, allow-
ing one to model heterogeneities at the individual level [8].
Agent-based models can incorporate heterogeneity in, for
example, transmission risk profiles of specific patients or
HCWs [15], but are usually restricted to the implementation of
stochastic simulations in small wards, and are computationally
constrained [2].
When constructing and studying these stochastic models,
efforts have been focused, and tailor-designed analytical and
numerical methods have been implemented, in order to analyse
the dynamics of the nosocomial outbreak when accounting
for spontaneous colonization of patients, patient-to-staff and
staff-to-patient contamination/colonization, environmental
contamination, patient cohorting, room configuration of the
hospital ward, staff hand-washing compliance levels, the
presence of different types of HCWs or specific staff–patientcontact network structures. This analysis is usually carried
out by means of studying summary statistics directly related
to the nosocomial outbreak, such as the reproduction number
of each particular agent (e.g. of a colonized patient or a con-
taminated healthcare worker) in the hospital ward. This is
usually computed in an approximative fashion, for example
by means of stochastic simulations or in terms of determinis-
tic approximations [16]. On the other hand, the limitations of
analysing these processes by simulation approaches, and the
convenience of following exact procedures instead when
dealing with small populations (such as those usually
involved in nosocomial outbreaks), have been highlighted
in [17].
In this work, we propose a versatile stochastic modelling
framework that can simultaneously account for all the factors
listed above, and which allows in §2 for the exact and analyti-
cal study of the reproduction number of each agent at the
hospital ward during the nosocomial outbreak. We make
use of five representative case studies in §3, regarding both
hypothetical and real nosocomial outbreaks at hospital
wards, to show how this unified modelling framework com-
prehend, as particular cases, many of the existing models in
the field. We conduct several numerical studies and our
results in §3 highlight the importance of maintaining high
hand-hygiene compliance levels by healthcare workers, sup-
port control strategies including to improve environmental
cleaning during nosocomial outbreaks and show the potential
of some healthcare workers to act as super-spreaders during
these outbreaks.2. A unified stochastic modelling framework
In this section, we propose the unified stochastic modelling
framework for the spread of nosocomial infections, where
agents represented in the model can be of different type
(patients, HCWs, surfaces, patients located in different
rooms, etc.). This general framework, which is constructed in
terms of a continuous-time Markov chain, allows one to
follow an exact and analytical approach for computing the
reproduction number of each different agent playing a role in
the infection spread, which measures the number of infections
directly caused by this agent until the agent stops spreading
the nosocomial pathogen. We also show how this reproduction
number can be exactly analysed while deciphering among
which individuals this agent is spreading the disease, so that
this becomes a quantitative measure of the infectiousness of
a given agent among individuals of different type. This then
becomes a useful tool when analysing the role played by
different routes of infection during a nosocomial outbreak in
a given hospital ward, as shown in numerical results in §3.
2.1. The model
We consider model depicted in figure 1, which amounts to a
stochastic SIS epidemic model with multiple compartmental
levels. In case studies 1–5 in §3, this modelling framework is
used to represent the spread of nosocomial infections, such as
MDRB, within a hospital ward, where the meaning of a com-
partmental level depends on the particular case study,
showing the versatility and flexibility of this unified framework.
We consider the stochastic process X ¼ {X(t) ¼
(I1(t), . . . ,IM(t)): t  0}, where Ij(t) amounts to the number of
infectives in compartmental level j at time t0. We assume
outbreak detection
and declaration
S1
m1 (i1, i2, …, iM)
d (i1, i2, …, iM)
m2 (i1, i2, …, iM)
l1 (i1, i2, …, iM)
l2 (i1, i2, …, iM)
…
mM (i1, i2, …, iM)
lM (i1, i2, …, iM)
I1
S2 I2
SM IM
Figure 1. Diagram representing the epidemic dynamics among M different
compartmental levels.
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remains constant throughout time, which is directly related to
standard assumptions when modelling nosocomial infections
(see §3). This means that the number Sj(t) of susceptibles in
compartmental level j at time t is given by Sj(t) ¼ Nj2 Ij(t)
for all t0. Process X evolves among states in S ¼ C< {D},
where
C ¼ {(i1, . . . ,iM) [ NM0 : 0  ij  Nj, j [ {1, . . . ,M}}:
State (i1, . . ., iM) represents the presence of ij infected individ-
uals at compartmental levels 1  j M, while the final state
D represents the detection and declaration of the outbreak in
the hospital ward. In particular, process X transits among
states in S according to the following transitions:
— Removal at compartmental level j: (i1, . . . ,iM)!
(i1, . . . ,ij  1, . . . ,iM), occurring at rate mj(i1, . . .,iM);
— Infection at compartmental level j: (i1, . . . ,iM)!
(i1, . . . ,ij þ 1, . . . ,iM), occurring at rate lj(i1, . . .,iM);
— Detection and declaration of the outbreak: (i1, . . . ,iM)! D,
occurring at rate d(i1, . . .,iM).
This unified model has been developed to account for
patients, different types of HCWs and/or surfaces involved
in a nosocomial outbreak in a hospital ward. The generality of
functions lj(i1, . . .,iM), mj(i1, . . .,iM) and d(i1, . . .,iM) allows for
incorporating into the model a wide range of factors having
an impact on the nosocomial spread dynamics. This means
that the particular meaning of each compartmental level
1  j M, as well as of each event (infections and removals
represented by arrows in figure 1) depends on the particular
hospital ward and pathogen under analysis; see §3 where
compartmental levels 1  j M can represent colonized/
non-colonized patients, contaminated/non-contaminated
HCWs, volunteers and surfaces, or can be related to the
specific spatial configuration of the hospital ward under
analysis, or the particular staff–patient contact network
(e.g. representing patient cohorting).
Outbreak detection and declaration rate d(i1, . . .,iM)
allows one to analyse situations where a nosocomial patho-
gen is introduced for the first time in a given hospital ward
(e.g. by admission of a colonized patient), starting an out-
break, and the spread dynamics are analysed until the
presence of this pathogen is detected by HCWs. By con-
veniently specifying the function rate d(i1, . . .,iM), different
hospital surveillance policies (e.g. detection by the first indi-
vidual showing symptoms, by random screening of patients
within the ward, or by systematic screening upon patient
admission) can be considered. However, as illustrated in §3,scenarios where the interest is not in the spread dynamics
until detection, but in the long-term infection dynamics of
the pathogen (e.g. endemic situations) and in assessing the
infectiousness of each agent within this ward, can be
analysed by setting d(i1, . . .,iM) ¼ 0. We note that setting
d(i1, . . .,iM) ¼ 0 means deleting the final state D in figure 1,
so that the infection dynamics during the nosocomial
outbreak would amount to the stochastic movement of
individuals, throughout time, between the susceptible and
infective compartments at the different compartmental
levels in figure 1; see case studies 2–5.
In subsection 2.1, and for a given initial state (I1(0), . . .,
IM(0)) ¼ (i1, . . .,iM), we analyse the exact reproduction number
for an infective individual in compartmental level j: the
number of infections (understood in a broad sense, see §3)
directly caused by this individual until he/she is removed
or until the outbreak is detected, R( j )(i1 ,. . . ,iM) [18–20]. Since
an infective individual at compartmental level j can infect
individuals at compartmental levels 1  k M, one can split
R(j)(i1,...,iM) ¼
PM
k¼1 R
(j)
(i1,...,iM)(k), where R
( j )
(i1 ,. . . ,iM)(k) is the number
of infections directly caused by an infective individual
at compartmental level j, among individuals at compart-
mental level k. In this way, random variables R( j )(i1 ,. . . ,iM)(k),
for 1  j, k M, allow one to assess the role played by the
different potential routes of infection during a nosocomial
outbreak in a hospital ward, in our numerical results in §3.
We note that the global variable R( j )(i1 ,. . . ,iM) measures the
infectiousness of an infective individual in compartmental
level j, until this individual stops spreading the infection
(he/she is removed) or until the outbreak is detected and
declared (so that control strategies such as antibiotic prescrip-
tion, isolation of infected individuals, patient cohorting or
environmental cleaning, can be implemented, impacting on
the infection spread dynamics). These summary statistics
can be studied from the solution of systems of linear
equations, by implementing first-step arguments. In the elec-
tronic supplementary material, we explain the corresponding
algorithmic procedures designed for solving these systems in
a matrix-oriented fashion.2.2. Reproduction number for an individual at
compartmental level j, among individuals at
compartmental level k
For a given compartmental level j and a given initial state
(i1, . . .,iM), we can define the random variable R
( j )
(i1 ,. . . ,iM),
which amounts to the total number of infections directly
caused by a marked infective individual at compartmental
level j until he/she is removed, or until the outbreak is
declared. We note that since quantity R( j )(i1 ,. . . ,iM) refers to an
infective individual at compartmental level j, it is only prop-
erly defined for initial states (i1, . . .,iM) with ij . 0. In case
studies 1–5 in §3, we focus on initial states of the form
(0, . . . ,0, 1|{z}
j
,0, . . . ,0),
representing that the infective individual under study is the
one at compartmental level j starting the outbreak. For this
initial state, the mean value E[R( j )(0,. . . ,0,1,0, . . . ,0)] directly relates
to the basic reproduction number (measuring the average
number of individuals this individual directly infects until
rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org
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detected—for an initially fully susceptible population).
We note that R( j )(i1 ,. . . ,iM) is in fact the sum of several
contributions,
R(j)(i1,...,iM) ¼
XM
k¼1
R(j)(i1,...,iM)(k),
where R( j )(i1 ,. . . ,iM)(k) represents the number of infections
caused, by this individual who is at compartmental level j,
only among individuals at compartmental level k. The analy-
sis of each variable R( j )(i1 ,. . . ,iM)(k) helps to measure not only
how infectious an individual that belongs to compartmental
level j is, but also how much of a risk he/she is for individ-
uals at a given compartmental level k. This allows us in §3
to explore the role played by the different potential trans-
mission routes during a nosocomial outbreak.
The probability distribution of each random variable
R( j )(i1 ,. . . ,iM)(k) is given in terms of probabilities
n
(j)
(i1,...,iM)(k; n) ¼ P(R
(j)
(i1,...,iM)(k) ¼ n), n  0:
Since these probabilities refer to a particular infected indi-
vidual, it is necessary to specify the contribution that
each infective individual has in the global infection rates
lj(i1, . . .,iM), as well as the rate at which this particular indivi-
dual is removed. Thus, we analyse quantities R( j )(i1 ,. . . ,iM)(k)
and R( j )(i1 ,. . . ,iM) for the following family of infection and
removal rates:
mj(i1,i2, . . . ,iM) ¼ mjij,
lj(i1,i2, . . . ,iM) ¼ lj þ
XM
k¼1
lkjik
 !
(Nj  ij),
for 1  j M, and any outbreak detection and declaration
rate d(i1, . . .,iM). This specification of rates is based on the
following general assumptions:
— Each infective individual at compartmental level j is
removed independently at rate mj;— Each susceptible individual at compartmental level j can
be infected due to an external source of infection, with
rate lj, or by an infective individual at compartmental
level k, with rate lkj.
We note that these functions have been defined in this
way so that they can be used in case studies 1–5 for the spread
of nosocomial pathogens in hospital wards, where events
related to rates mj, lj and lkj have specific meanings in each
case study in §3, according to different scenarios and hypoth-
eses considered in [15,19,21–23].
We follow here a first-step argument conditioning on the
next event to occur in the process. In particular, for the initial
state i ¼ (i1, . . ., iM), we have
P(R(j)i (k) ¼ n) ¼ P(R(j)i (k) ¼ n j i! D)P(i! D)
þ
XM
r¼1
P(R(j)i (k) ¼ n j i! (i1, . . . ,ir  1, . . . ,iM))
 P(i! (i1, . . . ,ir  1, . . . ,iM))
þ
XM
r¼1
P(R(j)i (k) ¼ n j i! (i1, . . . ,ir þ 1, . . . ,iM))
 P(i! (i1, . . . ,ir þ 1, . . . ,iM)):
ð2:1Þ
Notation i! (i1, . . . ,ir  1, . . . ,iM) represents the event that, if
the process is at state i at present time, the next event that
occurs in the process is the transition to state (i1, . . ., ir 2 1,
. . ., iM) (i.e. a removal occurs at compartmental level r). The
equation above, if we use notation
i ¼ (i1, . . . ,iM),
iþ(s) ¼ (i1, . . . ,is þ 1, . . . ,iM),
i(s) ¼ (i1, . . . ,is  1, . . . ,iM),
leads to the system of equations:uin
(j)
i (k; n) ¼ (mj þ d(i))1n¼0|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
removal of the marked individual,
or outbreak declaration
þmj(ij  1)n(j)i(j)(k; n)|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
removal of an individual,
–not the marked one –
at compartmental level (CL) j
þ1n.0l jk(Nk  ik)n(j)iþ(k)(k; n 1)|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
infection of an individual at CL k,
caused by the marked individual
þ
XM
p¼1, p=j
mpipn
(j)
i(p)(k; n)|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
removal of an individual
at CL p= j
þ
XM
p¼1, p=k
(Np  ip) lp þ
XM
l¼1
llpil
 !
n
(j)
iþ(p)(k; n)|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
infection of an individual at CL p=k
þ(Nk  ik) lk þ l jk(ij  1)þ
XM
l¼1, l=j
llkil
0
@
1
An(j)iþ(k)(k; n),|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
infection of an individual at CL k, not caused by the marked individual
ð2:2Þfor n0 and (i1, . . . ,iM) [ C, with ij . 0. 1A above is a function
equal to 1 if A is satisfied, and 0 otherwise, and
ui ¼ d(i)þ
XM
k¼1
mkik þ (Nk  ik) lk þ
XM
l¼1
llkil
 ! !
:We note that equation (2.2) is obtained by following argu-
ments in equation (2.1), and conditioning on the next event
that can potentially occur in the process. For example, let us
assume that process is at state i ¼ (i1, . . .,iM) at present time,
and we are computing probability n(j)i (k; n) ¼ P(R(j)i (k) ¼ n),
which relates to the reproduction number R( j )i (k) for a
),
rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org
J.R.Soc.Interface
15:20180060
5
 on July 3, 2018http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from marked infective individual at compartmental level j, among
individuals at compartmental level k. A potential event
which can occur is the recovery of an individual—different
to the marked one—at compartmental level j, which by
the theory of Markov processes occurs with probability
mj(ij2 1)/u(i1,. . . ,iM), moving the process to the new
state i2( j) ¼ (i1, . . ., ij2 1, . . .,iM). This leads to the addend
mj(ij2 1)n
ðjÞ
iðjÞðk;nÞ in equation (2.2), and similar arguments
can be applied for the rest of potential possible events that
can occur. Finally, we point out that the system of equations
given by equation (2.2) can be represented in matrix form,
and solved by starting with n ¼ 0, and then sequentially sol-
ving the system of equations for any value n1 by using
previously computed probabilities for n2 1, in an iterative
fashion; see the electronic supplementary material.
It is clear that, since
R(j)(i1,...,iM) ¼
XM
k¼1
R(j)(i1,...,iM)(k),
we can also focus on computing probabilities
n
(j)
(i1,...,iM)(n) ¼ P(R
(j)
(i1,...,iM) ¼ n), n  0,
for any initial state (i1, . . . ,iM) [ C with ij . 0. Probabilities
n( j )(i1 ,. . . ,iM)(n) satisfy
uin
(j)
i (n) ¼
XM
k¼1, k=j
mkikn
(j)
i(k)(n)þ mj(ij  1)n(j)i(j)(n)
þ (mj þ d(i))1n¼0 þ
XM
k¼1
(Nk  ik)l jkn(j)iþ(k)(n 1)1n.0
þ
XM
k¼1
(Nk  ik) lk þ
XM
l¼1, l=j
llkil þ l jk(ij  1)
0
@
1
An(j)iþ(k)(n
ð2:3Þ
for n0 and for any (i1, . . . ,iM) [ C, with ij . 0. This system is
expressed in matrix form, and solved in an iterative fashion,
in the electronic supplementary material.3. Case studies
In this section, we focus on five different representative exist-
ing models in the literature for the spread of nosocomial
infections. Our aim is to show how these models can be
seen as particular cases of the unified stochastic modelling
framework presented in §2, so that the methodology in sub-
section 2.1 can be directly applied, and the infectiousness of
each agent in the hospital ward can appropriately be quanti-
fied. In particular, case studies 1–5 can be represented into
our framework by specifying the number M of compart-
mental levels and their meaning, as well as the meaning of
the infection and removal events occurring at each com-
partmental level, and the specifications of rates mj, lj, ljk
and d(i1, . . ., iM). These rates are general enough in §2 in
order to account for all hypotheses usually considered
when modelling nosocomial infections (such as those con-
sidered in [15,19,21–23] related to case studies 1–5), and
also allow one to consider different hospital surveillance
policies for outbreak detection and declaration [24,25]. A
summary of these rates for each case study studied in this
section can be found in the electronic supplementary
material, Table S6.3.1. Modelling spread among patients and healthcare
workers
We focus here on the model by Artalejo [21], for a nosocomial
outbreak in a hospital ward with Np patients and NHCW
HCWs. Patients can be colonized or non-colonized at any
given time, and are discharged at rate m, regardless of their
colonization status. HCWs can have their hands contami-
nated or uncontaminated, and they wash their hands at rate
m0. Each colonized patient contaminates (the hands of) each
uncontaminated HCW at rate b0, while each contaminated
HCW colonizes each non-colonized patient at rate b. Admis-
sion of new patients occurs immediately after discharge, and
newly admitted patients can be colonized with probability s.
It is assumed in [21] that each colonized patient is detected at
rate g, which can be incorporated here by setting d(i1, i2) ¼ gi1
(i.e. outbreak declaration occurs upon detection of the first
colonized patient).
We note that the outbreak detection and declaration rate
d(i1, . . ., iM) can be set to account for different hypotheses
regarding hospital surveillance and screening. By setting
d(i1, i2) ¼ gi1 as above, one can represent random screening
being in place as the surveillance policy in the hospital
ward, where each patient is screened at an average time g21
[24], where this screening policy is identified as one of the
most efficient ones for the control of nosocomial outbreaks.
We also note that outbreak declaration rate d(i1, i2) ¼ gi1 can
also be used to represent the scenario where outbreak is
declared after the first colonized patient showing some symp-
toms, each colonized patient showing symptoms at rate g
(e.g. norovirus outbreaks are declared upon detection of sus-
pected cases, consisting of patients showing symptoms such
as diarrhoea and vomiting). On the other hand, if a colonized
patient is admitted into a hospital ward, and detection occurs
by screening upon admission where laboratory results take an
average time d21 to arrive, one could represent this by setting
d(i1, i2) ¼ d and with time t ¼ 0 representing the admission of
the colonized patient into the ward.
In figure 2, we show how this model can be represented
into our framework, by setting M ¼ 2, N ¼ Np þ NHCW,
where compartmental level j ¼ 1 amounts to colonized/
non-colonized patients and j¼ 2 amounts to uncontaminated/
contaminated HCWs. In order to incorporate the hypotheses
above, rate functions lj(i1, i2), mj(i1, i2) and d(i1, i2) are
defined as in figure 2, and summarized in the electronic
supplementary material, Table S6. Moreover, summary
statistics analysed in §2 have specific meanings in this par-
ticular case study, as described in table 1. We note here
that an alternative existing approach in the literature,
such as the model in [3], is to consider only colonized/
non-colonized patients explicitly in the model, where the
role played by contaminated HCWs is only implicitly
incorporated via a transmission rate b. Model in [3] could
be represented into our framework by setting M ¼ 1 (colo-
nized/non-colonized patients) and appropriately setting
rates m1(i1), l1(i1) and d(i1), which is omitted here for the
sake of brevity.
We use here parameter values considered in [21], for the
spread of MRSA in an hypothetical intensive care unit,
which are reported in the electronic supplementary material,
Table S1. When analysing the infectiousness of colonized
patients and contaminated HCWs, we can focus on comput-
ing the reproduction number of these individuals, as
model as in Artalejo [21] representation in our framework
outbreak detection
and declaration
arrival/dischargearrival/discharge
non-colonized
patients
uncontaminated
HCWs
contamination
hand-washing
contaminated
HCWs
colonized
patients
colonization
m1 (i1, i2)
d (i1, i2)
S1
S2
I1
I2
m2 (i1, i2)
l1 (i1, i2)
l1 (i1, i2) = (sm + bi2) (N1 – i1) m1 (i1, i2) = (1- s) mi1
m2 (i1, i2) = m¢i2l2 (i1, i2) = b¢i1 (N2 – i2)
M = 2, N1 = Np  N2 = NHCW
d (i1, i2) = gi1
I1 (t) = number of colonized patients at time t
I2 (t) = number of contaminated HCWs at time t
l2 (i1, i2)
Figure 2. Model by Artalejo [21] and its corresponding representation in our framework. Our representation leads to the same stochastic process to that in [21]. Case
study 1. (Online version in colour.)
Table 1. Meaning of our summary statistics for model in ﬁgure 2. Case
study 1.
R(1)(1,0) ¼ R(1)(1,0)(2) reproduction number of a colonized patient
starting the outbreak (among HCWs)
R(2)(0,1) ¼ R(2)(0,1)(1) reproduction number of a contaminated HCW
starting the outbreak (among patients)
rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org
J.R.Soc.Interface
15:20180060
6
 on July 3, 2018http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from described in §2 (table 1). While the reproduction number can
be computed, for a contaminated HCW (R(2)(0,1)), by direct
application of equation (2.3), a slight modification needs to
be considered when analysing the reproduction number of
a colonized patient; that is, when computing probabilities
n
(1)
(i1,i2)(n) ¼ P(R
(1)
(i1,i2) ¼ n). In particular, equation (2.3) for
model and rate functions in figure 2 leads to
u(i1,i2)n
(1)
(i1,i2)(n) ¼ m0i2n
(1)
(i1,i21)(n)þ 1n¼0((1 s)mþ gi1)
þ (i1  1)((1 s)mn(1)(i11,i2)(n)
þ (N2  i2)b0n(1)(i1,i2þ1)(n))
þ (N1  i1)(smþ bi2)n(1)(i1þ1,i2)(n)
þ 1n.0(N2  i2)b0n(1)(i1,i2þ1)(n 1)
ð3:1Þ
with u(i1,i2) ¼ m0i2 þ (12 s)m(i12 1) þ (N12 i1)(sm þ bi2) þ
(N2 2 i2)b0i1 þ (12 s)m þ gi1. However, we note that R(1)(1,0)
should amount to the number of infections (i.e. in this case,
HCW hands contaminations) directly caused by a given colo-
nized patient starting the outbreak until this patient is
discharged or the outbreak is detected, regardless of the
newly admitted patient being or not colonized. This means
that terms 1n¼0(12 s)m in equation (3.1) and (12 s)m in
u(i1,i2) need to be replaced by 1n¼0m and m, respectively, and
the same applies when analysing the reproduction number
of a colonized patient in case studies 2–4.
In figure 3, we plot the probability mass functions of
the reproduction number of a colonized patient (R(1)(1,0))
and of a contaminated HCW (R(2)(0,1)) starting the outbreak.
While the average outbreak declaration time is crucial for
limiting the reproduction number of a colonized patient,
this is not the case when looking at the reproduction
number of a contaminated HCW. This is related to thefact that the main limiting factor for the infectiousness
of a HCW is his/her hand-washing rate, which is some-
thing that we explore in more depth in the following
case studies.3.2. Considering different healthcare worker types
We focus here on the model by Wang et al. [22], which incor-
porates volunteers working at the hospital ward. They also
consider the spread of MRSA in the respiratory intensive
care unit (RICU) at Beijing Tongren Hospital, which is
formed by Np patients, NHCW HCWs and NV volunteers.
As assumed in [22], patients are admitted at rate l, who
can already be colonized upon admission with probability
w, and discharged at rate dC (if colonized) or dU (if non-colo-
nized). HCW–patient transmission rate bPH(12 h)/NP
consists of two contributions: the hygienic level h [ (0, 1)
during each HCW–patient contact, which is encoded in a
probability (1 2 h) of transmission per contact, and a contact
rate bPH, and similar comments apply to volunteer–patient
transmission rate bPV(12 j)/NP (for details, see [22, p. 3]
and related equations in [22, appendix]). In figure 4, we
depict how this model is represented into our framework,
in the asymptotic situation where immediate arrival of
patients is assumed after discharge (i.e. l! þ1), which is
a reasonable approximation for hospital wards under high
demand [3,23]. Since no detection is considered in [22],
where the interest is in the long-term dynamics of the
nosocomial spread and in analysing the infectiousness of
each individual in the ward, we set d(i1, . . ., iM) ¼ 0.
For parameter values in the electronic supplementary
material, Table S2, we plot in figures 5 and 6 the mean repro-
duction numbers of the different agents in this ward, for
varying values of model parameters. We compute in figure
5 the mean reproduction number of a colonized patient start-
ing the outbreak, among HCWs (E[R(1)(1,0,0)(2)]) and volunteers
(E[R(1)(1,0,0)(3)]), versus (d
21
C , h) and (d
21
C , j), respectively. Our
results suggest that transmission from patients to HCWs
played a significant role in this outbreak, where a given colo-
nized patient contaminates E[R(1)(1,0,0)(2)] ¼ 10.05 HCWs
during his/her stay in the ward. On the other hand, our
model suggests little transmission from colonized patients
to volunteers, with E[R(1)(1,0,0)(3)] ¼ 0.65. This remains true
even though the low hygienic level during patient–volunteer
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Figure 3. Probability mass functions of the reproduction number of a colonized patient (R(1)(1,0), a) and of a contaminated HCW (R
(2)
(0,1), b) starting the outbreak.
Average detection time of each patient g21[ f1, 2, 3, 4g days. Case study 1.
model as in Wang et al. [22]
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contaminated
HCWs
colonized
patients
colonization
contamination
contamination
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d (i1, i2, i3) = 0
outbreak detection
and declaration
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Np Np
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 (N1 – i1)
Np
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Figure 4. Model by Wang et al. [22] and its corresponding representation in our framework. Our representation leads to the same stochastic process to that in [22],
when l! þ1. Case study 2. (Online version in colour.)
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and seems to be related to the low intensity of these
contacts (bPV ¼ 0.2 for volunteers versus bPH ¼ 0.72 for
HCWs). Stochastic variability of the reproduction numbers
E[R(1)(1,0,0)(2)] ¼ 10.05 and E[R(1)(1,0,0)(3)] ¼ 0.65 can also be
assessed by our methodology in §2, in terms of standard
deviations SD[R(1)(1,0,0)(2)] ¼ 10.50 and SD[R(1)(1,0,0)(3)] ¼ 0.94.
These are readily obtained from the probability distributions
computed from equation (2.2).
When looking at possible control strategies, it seems clear
that the reproduction number of a colonized patient among
HCWs can be significantly reduced by improving the hygie-
nic level of each HCW–patient contact, while reducing the
length of stay of each patient does not significantly reduce
the infectiousness (i.e. contamination ability) of this patient,
and similar comments apply to patient–volunteer contacts.
In figure 6, the mean reproduction number of a contami-
nated HCW or volunteer is computed for varying values ofthe hygienic levels during each contact, as well as of the
hand-washing rates. The fact that HCWs wash their hands
an average of 24 times d21 in this ward keeps the reproduc-
tion number of these agents low, and only under significantly
low hand-washing compliance levels (gH , 5) a substantial
increase for this reproduction number is predicted. Thus,
for a particular HCW with low hand-washing compliance
level, hygienic level during each HCW–patient contact
becomes the most important factor determining the infection
spread, and similar comments apply to volunteers.3.3. Assessing environmental contamination
The important role played by environmental contamination
in nosocomial spread has been discussed in recent works in
the field [8,9], since pathogens such as MRSA and vancomy-
cin-resistant enterococci (VRE) are able to survive on dry
surfaces for weeks [26]. We consider here the model by
reproduction number of a HCW
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contaminated surfaces. The authors in [23] consider Np
patients, Ns HCWs and Ne surfaces for analysing an VRE out-
break in the onco-haematological unit at the University
Medical Center Freiburg in Germany. Colonized patients
are discharged at rate g 0, while non-colonized patients are
discharged at rate g. Discharged patients are immediately
replaced by newly admitted patients, who can be colonized
with probability f. HCWs wash their hands at rate m,
while surfaces are decontaminated at rate k. Transmission
between patients, HCWs and surfaces occur at rates (bsp,
bse, bps, bpe, bes, bep), where s stands for staff (HCWs), p for
patients and e for environment (surfaces). In figure 7,
we show how this model can be represented into our frame-
work, with the corresponding definition of the function
rates. Since no outbreak detection is considered in [23], we
set d(i1, i2, i3) ¼ 0.
In figures 8–10, we compute the mean reproduction
number of all the agents (i.e. patients, HCWs and surfaces)
in this hospital ward, for parameter values in the electronicsupplementary material, Table S3, which are the ones con-
sidered in [23] for the VRE outbreak in the onco-
haematological unit, and carry out a sensitivity analysis for
several model parameters. In particular, we plot in figure 8
the mean reproduction number of a colonized patient
among HCWs and among surfaces, versus the patient-to-
HCW (respectively, patient-to-surface) transmission rate bps
(bpe), and the average length of stay g 0
21 of any given colo-
nized patient. For the VRE outbreak considered in [23], an
average number of E[R(1)(1,0,0)(2)] ¼ 9.09 HCWs and
E[R(1)(1,0,0)(3)] ¼ 96.83 surfaces are contaminated by a colonized
patient during his/her stay in the ward, these results
suggesting that environmental contamination might be play-
ing a significant role in the infection spread, as suspected by
authors in [23]. Stochastic variability of these summary stat-
istics can be represented in terms of the standard deviations
SD[R(1)(1,0,0)(2)] ¼ 9.40 and SD[R(1)(1,0,0)(3)] ¼ 73.75, these large
quantities suggesting that the corresponding infection pro-
cesses are highly stochastic. We note that for a colonized
patient staying in the ward for an average of 20 days, and
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surface can be contaminated several times by this patient
during his/her stay. According to results in figure 8, both
reducing the average length of stay of patients and decreasing
contact rates (i.e. avoiding when possible patient–surface con-
tacts, or improving the hygienic level during each patient–
HCW contact) can help to reduce these mean reproduction
numbers.
Once a HCW is contaminated, his/her infectious potential
can be measured by means of his/her mean reproduction
number, which is analysed in figure 9. It seems clear from
results in figure 9 that the hand-washing rate m¼ 24 times d21
allows to keep this mean reproduction number, for a con-
taminated HCW, low among patients, although it can be
still significant (above 1) among surfaces. Results in figure 9
also suggest that HCWs with significantly low hand-hygiene
compliance levels (m , 10) could lead to reproduction num-
bers above 1.75 (among patients) and above 30 (amongsurfaces), so that our results support the fact that a single
HCW with relatively low hand-hygiene compliance level
could play a significant infectious role by means of contami-
nating a large amount of surfaces, and colonizing several
patients, until he/she washes his/her hands.
In figure 10, we plot analogous values for a contaminated
surface. Although for parameters considered in [23] the
reproduction numbers of any given contaminated surface
(among HCWs and patients) are relatively low, given the sub-
stantial number of surfaces that can be contaminated by a
colonized patient (figure 8) or a contaminated HCW with a
low hand-hygiene compliance level (figure 9), these numbers
should still not be neglected. It seems clear from figure 10 that
decontamination rate k ¼ 1 time d21 cannot be considered as
optimal during the course of a nosocomial outbreak, since
just by increasing this up to k ¼ 2 times d21 a significant
reduction in the reproduction number of any contaminated
surface could be achieved. This seems to support existing
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national guidelines on the management of outbreaks of norovirus
infection in healthcare settings [27] issued by the National Disease
Surveillance Centre in Ireland, which involve cleaning affected
areas of the ward twice daily during norovirus outbreaks.
Results in figure 10 also suggest that, if k ¼ 1 time d21 had to
be maintained for any reason, then recommendations among
HCWs and patients on reducing as much as possible infectious
contacts with surfaces during an outbreak could still have a sig-
nificant impact in reducing the infectivity of any given
contaminated surface, specially among patients.
3.4. Incorporating space through room configuration of
the ward
The model by Lo´pez-Garcı´a [19] incorporates room configur-
ation into the nosocomial infection dynamics, where the main
hypothesis is that for some nosocomial pathogens, the trans-
mission rate between patients in the same room would be
higher than the transmission rate for patients in differentrooms (this might be the case, for example, when considering
airborne transmission [10], if patients in the same room are
treated by the same common HCW [15] or when considering
isolation rooms where specific control protocols are followed
[19]). Since the infection dynamics in [19] are model for an
intensive care unit with four rooms, by a simple SIR epidemic
model, where no discharge and arrival of patients is con-
sidered, we analyse a more realistic scenario here where
patients are discharged at rate n, and immediately replaced
by newly admitted patients, who can be colonized with prob-
ability pC. A transmission rate bSR is considered for patients
in the same room, while bDR is the transmission rate for
patients in different rooms, and HCWs are not explicitly
included into the model. A spontaneous colonization rate l
is also considered in [19], and no outbreak detection and
declaration is assumed so that we set d(i1, i2, i3, i4) ¼ 0; see
figure 11 for the representation into our framework.
For parameter values considered in [19], reported in the
electronic supplementary material, Table S4, we compute in
figure 12 the reproduction number of a colonized patient
hospital ward room configuration from
López-García [19]
representation in our framework*
*discharge and arrival of patients considered , instead of recovery
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Figure 11. Hospital ward room configuration from Lo´pez-Garcı´a [19] and its representation in our framework. Our representation leads to an arguably more realistic
stochastic process to that in [19], where patients arrival and discharge are incorporated. Case study 4. (Online version in colour.)
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versus transmission rates (bDR, bSR). We note that Rooms 3
and 4 are equivalent to Room 2, and are thus not analysed.
It is interesting to note that for parameter values considered
in [19], the reproduction number of a patient at Room 1 is
E[R(1)(1,0,0,0)] ¼ 1.62, while it is E[R(2)(0,1,0,0)] ¼ 1.54 for a patient
at Room 2. Stochastic variability of these summary statistics
can be represented in terms of the standard deviations
SD[R(1)(1,0,0,0)] ¼ 1.73 and SD[R(2)(0,1,0,0)] ¼ 1.67. A threshold be-
haviour can be observed in both plots in figure 12, where
reducing the contact rate between patients in the same
room does not seem to have a significant effect on the repro-
duction number of a patient starting the outbreak at Room
2. For this room, it is the transmission rate between different
rooms bDR which has a significant impact. This seems to sup-
port the idea of implementing patient cohorting as an
infection control strategy, where a given HCW treating
patients in the same room would avoid, when possible, to
treat patients in a different room during the course of a noso-
comial outbreak. On the other hand, a parameter threshold
can also be observed for a patient starting the outbreak atRoom 1, but this threshold depends on a nonlinear combi-
nation of the values (bSR, bDR). In particular, both reducing
the contact rate between patients in the same room and
between patients in different rooms can move the value of
the reproduction number near or below 1.3.5. Modelling healthcare workers–patient contact
network with different healthcare workers
infection risk profiles
Finally, we focus here on the model by Temime et al. [15],
where the potential of some HCWs in a hospital ward to
act as super-spreaders during a nosocomial outbreak is
assessed. Temime et al. [15] consider an hypothetical hospital
ward with three types of HCWs: AP1 (a profile involving fre-
quent contacts with a limited number of patients, typically a
nurse), AP2 (a profile involving fewer contacts with more
patients, typically a physician) and a peripatetic HCW (invol-
ving a single daily contact with all patients, for instance a
therapist or a radiologist). These different HCW profiles
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tacts can be considered as high risk, AP2-patient contacts
have moderate risk and peripatetic-patient contacts have
low risk [15, fig. 1]. This is encoded here by considering trans-
mission rates bAP1 . bAP2 . bPeri. The authors in [15]
consider an hypothetical hospital ward with 18 beds, that
all HCWs wash their hands at rate m, and that all patients
are discharged at rate g, being immediately replaced by
new non-colonized admitted patients. By means of agent-
based stochastic simulations, authors simulate the spread of
a nosocomial pathogen (using data for MRSA and VRE) in
this ward while incorporating details such as the duration
of each HCW–patient contact, the probability of pathogen
transmission during a 20min HCW–patient contact, or the
existence of day/night HCW shifts.
In figure 13, we represent a simplified version of this
model into our framework, for a smaller hospital ward with
eight patients, four AP1 HCWs, two AP2 HCWs and one
peripatetic HCW, but when considering the same contact
network structure than the one studied in [15, fig. 1]. Trans-
mission rates bAP1, bAP2 and bPeri in electronic supplementary
material, Table S5 are obtained by taking into account the
duration of each HCW–patient contact type, as well as the
probability of pathogen transmission during each contact,
by using values in [15, table 1] and following the arguments
in [15, supplementary material I]. Since no outbreak detection
is considered in [15], we set d(i1, . . ., i11) ¼ 0 and
lj(i1, . . . ,i11)¼ (bAP1i4þjþbAP2i9þbPerii11)(Nj i j), 1 j 2,
lj(i1, . . . ,i11)¼ (bAP1i4þjþbAP2i10þbPerii11)(Nj i j), 3 j 4,
lj(i1, . . . ,i11)¼bAP1i j4(Nj i j), 5 j 8,
l9(i1, . . . ,i11)¼bAP2(i1þ i2)(N9 i9),
l10(i1, . . . ,i11)¼bAP2(i3þ i4)(N10 i10),
l11(i1, . . . ,i11)¼bPeri(i1þ i2þ i3þ i4)(N11 i11),
mj(i1, . . . ,i11)¼ gij, 1 j 4,
mj(i1, . . . ,i11)¼mij, 5 j 11:
Given the complexity of this model, we report in table 2
the meanings of our summary statistics in §2. In figure 14,
we plot the mean reproduction number of a representative
colonized patient (e.g. P1,a) starting the outbreak, among
those HCWs that treat him/her (AP11, AP21 and peripatetic).
These values are mainly dominated by bAP1 and g
21;
that is, by the contact rate for high transmission risk con-
tacts and the length of stay of the patient in the ward.
For parameters in the electronic supplementary material,
Table S5, a colonized patient contaminates around
E[
P
j[{5,9,11} R
(1)
(1,0,...,0)(j)] ¼ 5:3 HCWs during his/her stay,
with SD[
P
j[{5,9,11} R
(1)
(1,0,...,0)(j)] ¼ 5:78. By analysing values of
E[R(1)(1,0,. . . ,0)(5)], E[R
(1)
(1,0,. . . ,0)(9)] and E[R
(1)
(1,0,. . . ,0)(11)] separately,
one can decipher that this corresponds to E[R(1)(1,0,. . . ,0)(5)] ¼
3.42 contamination events to the AP11, E[R
(1)
(1,0,. . . ,0)(9)] ¼ 1.19
to the AP21 and E[R
(1)
(1,0,. . . ,0)(11)] ¼ 0.69 to the peripatetic
HCW. However, we note that since AP11 only treats two
patients, while the peripatetic treats eight patients, the peripa-
tetic HCW might have his/her hands contaminated for longer
periods during a nosocomial outbreak.
In figure 15, we plot the mean reproduction number of
the AP11 (E[R
(5)
(0,0,0,0,1,0,. . . ,0)(1)]), the AP21 (E[R
(9)
(0,. . . ,0,1,0,0)(1) þ
R(9)(0,. . . ,0,1,0,0)(2)]) and the peripatetic (E[
P4
j¼1 R
(11)
(0,...,0,1)(j)])
HCW starting the outbreak. Larger values are found for theperipatetic HCW, even though its low transmission risk per
contact (bPeri, bAP2 , bAP1), which is directly related to
the large number of patients this peripatetic HCW treats.
Larger mean reproduction numbers found for AP11 than
for AP21 suggest, however, that there exists a trade-off
between the transmission risk profile of each contact
(encoded by rates bAP2 and bAP1) and the number of patients
that each HCW treats (i.e. the particular contact network
within the hospital ward). The potential for the peripatetic
HCW to act as a super-spreader can be noticed from a com-
bination of results in figures 14 and 15. In particular, we note
that the infectious potential of the peripatetic HCW is
enhanced by the fact that this HCW might have his/her
hands contaminated for long periods, since each of the
eight patients treated by this HCW, who might be colonized,
contaminates peripatetic HCW hands an average of 0.69
times during their stay. Moreover, it is clear from our results
that low hygiene levels during peripatetic-patient contacts
(i.e. increasing values of bPeri) might significantly increase the
number of patients that this HCW colonizes until washing
his/her hands, and results in figure 15 suggest that the same
applies for his/her hand-washing compliance level, which
could enhance his/her role as a super-spreader during a
nosocomial outbreak.4. Discussion
In this work, we present a unified stochastic modelling frame-
work for the analysis of the spread of nosocomial infections.
This unified model allows one to move from more compart-
ment-based models for highly homogeneous scenarios (M 1),
to agent-based type models when dealing with highly hetero-
geneous settings (M  N , where N is the total number of
individuals in the population). We note that when considering
the asymptotic case M ¼ N, with Nj ¼ 1 for all 1  j M, the
resulting space of states C contains QMj¼1 (Nj þ 1) ¼ 2N states,
as in this case one is in fact analysing the SIS epidemic
model on a network [18,19]. Our unified framework allows
one to consider different hypotheses related to the detection
and declaration of the nosocomial outbreak, or to analyse
the long-term infection spread when this detection is not rel-
evant. This versatile model also allows us to represent a
wide range of agents involved in the nosocomial outbreak,
to account for hand-washing compliance levels, environ-
mental cleaning, patients arrival/discharge, spatial
components such as the hospital ward room configuration,
different types of HCWs corresponding to different pathogen
transmission risks, as well as specific patient–staff contact net-
work topologies.
Our methodology within this unified framework allows
one to exactly analyse the probability distribution of the
exact reproduction number of each agent in the ward. More-
over, this summary statistic can be split into several ones
accounting for the infections caused by a given individual
among individuals of a particular type. This translates into
analysing the infectiousness of patients, HCWs, volunteers
or surfaces among individuals of each of these groups, so
that the role played by each potential contact transmission
route can be assessed for nosocomial outbreaks correspond-
ing to different healthcare facilities and pathogens. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first time that this analytical
approach, which has been usually neglected when analysing
hospital ward contact network from Temime et al. [15] representation in our framework
M = 11, Ni = 2 1 £ i £ 4, Nj = 1 5 £ j £ 11
outbreak detection
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I4 + j(t)  = number (0 or 1) of contaminated AP1j at time t, 1 £ j £ 4
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Figure 13. Staff–patient contact network from Temime et al. [15] and representation in our framework. Our representation leads to a simplified version of the
stochastic process in [15], for a reduced version of the hospital ward represented in [15, fig. 1]. Case study 5. (Online version in colour.)
Table 2. Meaning of our summary statistics for model in ﬁgure 13. Case study 5.
R(1)(1,0,. . . ,0) ¼ R(1)(1,0,. . . ,0)(5) þ R(1)(1,0,. . . ,0)(9) þ R(1)(1,0,. . . ,0)(11) reproduction number of patient P1,a
R(5)(0,0,0,0,1,0,. . . ,0) ¼ R(5)(0,0,0,0,1,0,. . . ,0)(1) reproduction number of the AP11 HCW
R(9)(0,. . . ,0,1,0,0) ¼ R(9)(0,. . . ,0,1,0,0)(1) þ R(9)(0,. . . ,0,1,0,0)(2) reproduction number of the AP21 HCW
R(11)(0,...,0,1) ¼
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Figure 14. Mean reproduction number of patient P1a among all HCWs treating him/her (E[
P
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(1,0,...,0)(j)]), versus g
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ate-to-large sizes—due to computational constraints—is
applied in the area of nosocomial infections where popu-
lations are usually small and heterogeneous, making its
implementation feasible. We note that, although the focus
here has been on studying the reproduction number of each
individual, alternative summary statistics of interest allowing
for first-step analysis (such as the length or the final size of
the outbreak [18,19]) could be analysed in the same way by
means of this unified framework and our methodology in §2.
Our unified framework, together with the analytical
approach in §2, allows one to exactly compute the corre-
sponding reproduction numbers and to use these to assess
the role played by the different routes of infection during a
nosocomial outbreak. At the same time, the fact that all scen-
arios in §3—and potentially others—can be representedinto our unified framework, means that computer codes
developed for solving equations (2.2)–(2.3) for the general
model in figure 1 can be readily applied in all these scen-
arios, just by specifying the corresponding mj(i1, . . ., iM),
lj(i1, . . ., iM) and d(i1, . . ., iM) rates. On the other hand, we
acknowledge that this unified stochastic framework represented
by the diagram in figure 1 entails several simplifying
assumptions and limitations. The constant size assumed for
each compartmental level means that the total number of
agents of each type (patients, HCWs, surfaces, volunteers,
etc.) remains constant during the course of the nosocomial
outbreak. When focusing on patients, this is only appropriate
under high demand situations, where the time during which
any given bed is empty is short enough and can be neglected
in the corresponding model. Under moderate demand, and
if one needs to incorporate empty beds explicitly in the
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S1(t) (if j ¼ 1 represents the compartmental level correspond-
ing to patients) is incorporated as an additional variable into
the continuous-time Markov chain X , so that S1(t) þ I1(t) is
not necessarily constant throughout time. Moreover, more
complex situations such as nosocomial outbreaks occurring
across several hospital wards, with patient movement
between wards, or competitive scenarios where several bac-
terial strains (e.g. antibiotic-sensitive versus antibiotic-
susceptible [28]) are spreading simultaneously within the
same hospital ward, cannot be directly represented into our
framework by just specifying rates mj(i1, . . ., iM), lj(i1, . . ., iM)
and d(i1, . . ., iM). Instead, alternative diagramatic represen-
tations to that in figure 1 should be explored, potentially
including movement of agents between different compart-
mental levels.
We also note that our methodology directly relies on
the fact that the model proposed is a continuous-time
Markov chain, so that events are Markovian and inter-event
times are assumed to be exponentially distributed. While
this is a typical assumption in the literature when analysing
nosocomial outbreaks from a stochastic perspective, we
acknowledge that the exponential distribution might not be
appropriate for some particular events in these processes,
such as patients’ lengths of stay. Although relaxing the Mar-
kovian assumption in these models is out of the scope of this
paper, it is worth to point out here that some attempts have
already been made in this area, some of them based on the
use of phase-type distributions for incorporating these non-
Markovian events [29,30].
Finally, we acknowledge here that additional limita-
tions of our approach are of computational nature, related
to solving systems of around #C ¼QMk¼1 (Nk þ 1) linearequations. However, populations usually involved in nosoco-
mial outbreaks are small enough for this methodology to be
efficiently implemented, where specific procedures for deal-
ing with systems of equations involving highly sparse
matrices can be specially useful. We also note that while
N ¼ 20 þ 5 þ 100 ¼ 125 individuals in case study 3 (patients,
HCWs and surfaces) lead to analysing a stochastic process
with #C ¼ 12726 states, only N ¼ 2 þ 2 þ 2 þ 2 þ 1 þ 1 þ
1 þ 1 þ 1 þ 1 þ 1 ¼ 15 individuals in case study 5 (patients,
AP1, AP2 and peripatetic HCWs) lead to #C ¼ 10368
states, which is directly related to the high level of individual
heterogeneity introduced into this model (encoded by the
number of compartmental levels M ¼ 3 versus M ¼ 11).
These comments suggest that while agent-based simulation
approaches should prevail under highly heterogeneous scen-
arios, such as the complete model by Temime et al. [15], more
homogeneous or low-to-moderate heterogeneous settings
allow for this exact approach to be implemented.Data accessibility. Computer codes (in Python) to reproduce our results in
§3 are available in [31].
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